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NOTES
An Aspect of the Texas Juvenile Delinquency Law
"Morals"

-

Defendant, a fourteen-year-old girl, left home frequently and stayed

away for indefinite periods of time. On these occasions, she would
with a girl who, according to defendant's mother, was a prostitute.
defendant, only partially dressed, was found by a policeman and
mother in a downtown apartment with a young adult male. She

stay
The
her
was

adjudged a delinquent and remanded to the custody of the Texas Youth
Council pursuant to the Texas Juvenile Act.' Her confinement was set
for an indefinite period of time, not to extend past her twenty-first
birthday. The provision of the Act relied upon by the court defines a
delinquent child as one who "habitually so deports himself as to injure
or endanger the morals or health of himself or others."' Held, affirmed:

The meaning of the word "morals" is sufficiently clear to convey to the
person of ordinary intelligence those activities which are forbidden, and
therefore, the word "morals" is not unconstitutionally vague. E.S.G. v.
State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), error ref. n.r.e., cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
I.

THE

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS

DOCTRINE

When a statute is challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of vague-

ness, some standard must be used to apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine. In Connally v. General Construction Co.' the Supreme Court held
that if men of common intelligence would have to guess at the standard

required of them by a particular statute, then that statute must be struck
down. In Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States4 the Court concluded
that a criminal statute must give notice of the conduct expected of one
who would avoid its penalties, and it should provide the judge with
insight into its applications and should guide the attorney in defending
a client charged with its violation. The Court stated that because most
words cannot be reduced to mathematical symbols, and because most
statutes must attempt to deal with an untold number of fact situations,
no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.! The
Court recognized that practical necessities limit legislators in spelling
out prohibitions; therefore, it is appropriate to consider the problems with
which Congress was dealing when it enacted the statute in question, and
why Congress chose the particular language that it used.!
Several state courts have held that the standard to be used in deter'TEx.

Id.§

REv. CIrV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1

3(f).

'269 U.S. 385 (1926).
4342 U.S. 337 (1952).
4

Id. at 340.
Id. at 341-42.

(1968).
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mining statutory vagueness is whether the words challenged are of long
usage and common understanding." "Long usage" requires that either the

particular jurisdiction, or other jurisdictions, have used the challenged
word or phrase in previous statutes." "Common understanding" means
that when other statutes using similar language have been challenged,
they have been upheld by the courts as sufficiently clear and unambigu-

ous.' If this test is met, courts will usually sustain the statute in question."
Texas courts have announced a similar mode of determining unconstitutional vagueness in statutes. A statute may be somewhat ambiguous so
that judicial interpretation is necessary, but an act will not usually be

sustained unless its terms are as certain as the subject matter permits." In
Wilson v. State the defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated "to some extent."" The statute under which he was convicted made
it a criminal offense to drive upon any public road or highway in the
State of Texas while "intoxicated or in any degree under the influence
of intoxicating liquor."'" The Texas court of criminal appeals found this
language to be unconstitutionally vague, because no criterion could be
established to enable the trial court to define the meaning of the statute
in instructing the jury.'
Strict construction of penal statutes is preferred." "[T]he more severe
the penalty, and the more disastrous the consequences to the person subjected to the provisions of the statute, the more rigid will be the construction of its provisions in favor of such person and against enforcement of such law."' " Thus, a law should not be permitted to survive if
it is not reasonably calculated to inform a person that he is violating it,
or is about to violate it.'
In Oriental Oil Co. v. Brown'8 the appellant asserted that the appellee,
in violating a penal statute, had been negligent per se. The applicable
portion of the statute provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
operate or drive any motor or other vehicle upon the public highways of
Texas . . . within or through any town or village not incorporated, at a
greater rate of speed than twenty (20) miles per hour . . . ."" Appellee
complained that no one could determine exactly where the boundaries of
an unincorporated town or village were located, and that each driver
would be forced to rely on his own judgment as to when he was within
such a town or village. The Texas Commission of Appeals, citing tertiary
'See Gunn v. State, 89 Ga. 341, 152 S.E. 458 (1892); Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. v. Erbe,
251 Iowa 1330, 105 N.W.2d 650 (1960); State v. Katz Drug Co., 352 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1961).
"Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. v. Erbe, 251 Iowa 1330, 105 N.W.2d 650 (1960).
8State v. Katz Drug Co., 352 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1961).
"'Gunn v. State, 89 Ga. 341, 342, 15 S.E. 458, 459 (1892).
" See Comment, Constitutional Law--Indefinite Statutes Defining Crimes, 8 TEXAs L. REV.
253-60 (1930).
12 123 Tex. Crim. 415,

59 S.W.2d 399 (1933).
PEN. CODE ANN. art. 802 (1961).
Tex. Crim. 415, 416, 59 S.W.2d 399, 400 (1933).
"Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. State, 100 Tex. 420, 100 S.W. 766 (1907).
'1id. at 421, 100 S.W. at 767.
T
' Ex parte Slaughter, 92 Tex. Crim. 212, 243 S.W. 478 (1922).
'"130 Tex. 240, 106 S.W.2d 136 (1937).

"TEX.

14123

9

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.

art. 827a,

§

8 (1961).
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authority with approval, 0 pointed out that a statute establishing a rule of
conduct not greatly different from the rule of ordinary care, while too
indefinite to be capable of enforcement in criminal proceedings, may be
definite enough to furnish a rule of civil conduct.
Thus, Texas follows the majority of American jurisdictions in analyzing the validity of statutes. However, Texas goes one step further
and declares that penal statutes which may be void for indefiniteness may
be upheld in some instances as a valid civil rule.
II.

JUVENILE

PROCEEDINGS AND STATUTES

Proceedings. At the turn of the century, an increasing social awareness
prompted public recognition that the juvenile offender should be corrected as a child rather than punished as an adult." The child, as a result
of his incarceration with hardened criminals, might never escape the
social stigma of a criminal conviction. 2' Despite the fact that the child
was free to avoid any contractual obligations because he lacked sophistication in dealing with businessmen, he was nonetheless subject to adult
penalty standards whenever he violated the law."
The impetus necessary for legislative action was provided by the
Chicago Women's Club and the Catholic Visitation Aid Society, which
are credited with urging the first juvenile laws.' On July 1, 1899, the
Illinois state legislature established the first juvenile court, and by 1920
only three states lacked a juvenile court system." In the juvenile courts,
proceedings were characterized as civil, and the term "criminal" was not
attached to a juvenile offender." Understanding, guidance, and protection
were stressed, and such concepts as guilt, punishment, and criminal responsibility were supposedly de-emphasized.'
As a result of this paternalistic approach, rights accorded adult citizens
were not provided in juvenile proceedings. In most jurisdictions, the
juvenile had no right to counsel or right to trial by jury; in fact, "under
the juvenile code, a child was to have a right not to liberty, but to
custody."'" In In re Gault"' the Supreme Court recognized that the term
"delinquent" had come to involve only slightly less stigma than the
term "criminal." Therefore, the Court announced that the basic requirements of due process and fundamental fairness must be met in juvenile
delinquency proceedings: "Under our Constitution the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."'"
Prior to Gault, in Dendy v. Wilson,"' the Supreme Court of Texas
20

130 Tex. at 241, 106 S.W.2d at 137, citing 42 C.J. Motor Vehicles § 37, at 631 (1928).
GLUECK, THE PROBLEM OF DELINQUENCY 259 (1959).

21 S

"id.

at 257.

"3J. MACK, THE CHANCERY PROCEDURE IN THE JUVENILE COURT 311
"4 C. VEDDER, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER 255 (1954).

"Id.

(1925).

at 235-36.

26S.
GLUECK, supra note 21,
7

at 259.
1Id. at 257.
2"Term Paper, juvenile Delinquency, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 352, 353 (1969).
"387 U.S. 1 (1966).
3"id. at 28.
3' 142 Tex. 460, 474-76, 179 S.W.2d 269, 274-77 (1944).
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held that the juvenile court must meet the following: (1) If the juvenile
defendant requests it, he must be granted a jury trial; (2) reasonable and
definite charges must be filed against the defendant; (3) the defendant
is entitled to have his rights3 fully safeguarded; and (4) the customary
rules of evidence in civil cases must be followed. Thus, the trial court's
powers must be cautiously exercised, even though the Texas Juvenile
Act provides that the Act shall be liberally construed." Obviously, liberal
construction should not be allowed to emasculate the decision in Gault.
Statutes. A majority of American jurisdictions have statutes similar to
the Texas Juvenile Act and allow a finding of juvenile delinquency when
the defendant is found to have engaged in immoral conduct." Many
states also have statutes which impose penalties on adults who encourage
minors to lead an immoral life." These statutes are usually upheld by
the courts." However, in State v. Gallegos"s the Supreme Court of
Wyoming broke with the majority and declared unconstitutional a statute' making it unlawful to endanger the morals, welfare, or health of
any child under nineteen years of age. In striking down the statute, the
court admitted that respectable authority in many sister states approved
of legislation using somewhat similar language." In In re Morrison" the
Supreme Court of Iowa upheld a statute' which allowed a finding of
"neglected child" when the court found conduct likely to be detrimental
to the physical or mental health or morals of the child. The only reason
given for upholding the statute was that the provisions did not lack the
specificity necessary to make them invalid as criminal provisions.
Not only must the juvenile offender be protected from overly broad
statutes, he must also be protected from an all encompassing definition
of delinquent child. Just as there are several degrees of criminal blameworthiness in adult offenders, so too are there degrees of delinquent
3'These "rights" are not defined by the court.
"Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
34
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 2 (1968).
35ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (1962); AMZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-201(6) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-204 (1964); CAL. CIv. CODE § 601 (West
1954); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-53 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.10, § 901 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-701 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-3204 (1956); IOWA CODE § 232.2(13) (1969); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1570 (1968); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2552 (1964); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 26, § 52(e) (1957); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 712.2 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1959); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7185-02(g) (1966);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-602 (1943); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-8-26 (1955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.02 (Page 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, 5 269-1(2) (1933); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(9) (1962).
2
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 700(k), 702 (West 1954); WYo. STAT. ANN. 5
14-23(d) (1965).

"See,

e.g., People v. Deibert, 17 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (1953); Scire v. Mecum,

19 Conn. Supp. 373, 114 A.2d 385 (Super. Ct. 1955); In re Morrison, 259 Iowa 301, 144 N.W.2d
97 (1966); Hall v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); State v. Patterson,
188 Minn. 492, 249 N.W. 187 (1933).
88384
P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1963).
9
' WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-23 (1965).
40384 P.2d at 969.
4'259 Iowa 301, 144 N.W.2d 97 (1966).
'
IOWA CODE § 232.2 (1950).
43144 N.W.2d at 103.
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misbehavior. Yet, in most jurisdictions, no distinction is made between
the juvenile who commits a lesser offense and one who commits a greater
one. Most jurisdictions simply lump them all together and declare all
juveniles who break the law to be delinquents. However, the states of
Kansas and Illinois have attempted, through their respective legislatures,
to rectify this situation." In Kansas, a child can be adjudged a delinquent
for the commission of a felony,' but in order to be adjudged a delinquent
for the commission of a misdemeanor, a juvenile must have been found
to be a "Miscreant child" for commission of misdemeanors on at least
three previous occasions.' A runaway or disobedient child is classified
as "wayward," and can only be declared a delinquent after being adjudged
a "Wayward child" nine or more times." Illinois recognizes two classifications: a "Delinquent Minor," the more serious offender, and a "Minor
in Need of Supervision," the less serious offender."'
Other states also recognize degrees of delinquency, but none has gone
nearly so far in attempting to deal with the various types of offenders.
In these two states alone, lesser offenders are not subject to confinement
in the state reform school along with the more serious offenders." Broad
discretion is still granted to the judge in disposing of any juvenile case,
but the stigma of the word delinquent does not attach to the lesser
offenders. The juvenile court will acquire jurisdiction over juveniles committing minor offenses and will thereby be in a position to help keep
them from becoming more serious offenders.'
Thus, legislation and procedure with regard to juvenile delinquents
have shown some progress in this country. In 1899, the United States
emerged as the first nation to end capital punishment as a method of
dealing with juvenile delinquents. 1 In the seventy-one years since then,
legislation has progressed to the point that, in at least two states, the
runaway and the disobedient child do not have to fear incarceration in
the state reform school.

III. E.S.G. v.

STATE

In E.S.G. v. State" a Texas court of civil appeals held that the word
"morals" is not unconstitutionally vague as applied in the Texas Juvenile
Act. The court based its holding on the premise that the word "morals"
is sufficiently clear and comprehensive so that most persons can agree on
its meaning and application. It is a word that the court felt was sufficiently
explicit to inform those subject to the provisions of the Act of what will
render them liable to its penalties. The court pointed out that it would
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-3, 705-2 (Smith-Hurd 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-826
(1964).
" KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-826 (1964).
4Id. § 38-826(b) (2).
47 Id.
48ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-3, 705-2 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
49 See Term Paper, supra note 28, at 362-67.
50
Id. at 365.
" J. MACK, supra note 23, at 314.
5'447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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be an impossible task to define all of the types of behavior that could
injure a child's morals. The word is of long usage, and apparently an
understanding of those activities which are deemed immoral by the court
should be instinctive in potential defendants. Thus, the child is left to
decide for himself which activities bring him dangerously close to confinement, and, therefore, he is placed in the position of gambling with
several years of his life to decide that which neither the court nor the
legislature can or will decide. If the word "morals" conveys concrete
impressions to the ordinary person, there is no apparent reason why the
court or the legislature did not expand upon the word to give potential
offenders general concepts of what is meant by the language. Perhaps the
word was purposely inserted into the statute, in an ambiguous manner, to
give the juvenile judge complete discretion over the wards of the state."
Or, perhaps the concept of parens patriae overwhelms the necessity of
equality under the law for younger citizens.54 But the court did not base
its holding on either of these reasons.
Significantly, the court relies heavily on a California decision to sustain the statute. In People v. Deibert' a California court of appeals held
that a statute making it a criminal offense to commit any act or omission which tends to cause or encourage a minor to lead an idle, dissolute,
lewd, or immoral life, met constitutional standards of certainty and
definiteness. The court also held that the word "immoral" was sufficiently
definite to inform those subject to the statute of the type of conduct
prohibited.* "Morals," the court held, was to be accepted in its general
sense to allow the legislature to come to grips effectively with the problems of juvenile delinquency, and the wording of the statute should be
upheld if commonly understood by men of ordinary intelligence." By
using this case as one of its two sole authorities, the court in E.S.G.
appears to charge minors with knowledge equal to that of an adult. The
court confirms this suspicion by relying on Lowe v. Texas Liquor Control
Board," where the appellant sought a reversal of the revocation of his
package store permit. The revocation was pursuant to a penal statute"9
which allowed revocation in the event that the business was conducted in
a manner offensive to the general welfare, health, peace, morals, and
safety of the people. The court rejected appellant's argument that the
statute was couched in vague terms and further held that the word
,'morals" had a well-accepted and well-understood meaning." Again,
however, the court in E.S.G. has relied upon a case dealing with an adult
to substantiate its reasoning.
The dissent in E.S.G. emphasizes that a statute must be sufficiently
clear to give notice to potential offenders of required or prohibited ac13 S. GLUECK, supra note 21, at 257.
54 Id.
51 17 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (1953).
5"256 P.2d at 356.

5 id.

5 255 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
5
"TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-12(6) (1961).
60255 S.W.2d at 257.
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1
tivity in order properly to ward off a vagueness attack." The thrust of
the dissenting argument is that while courts have consistently upheld the
word "morals" in statutes, none has been able to offer a satisfactory
definition of what the term means. It is argued that "morals" is a word
which defies definition, and in fact has no objective meaning. The dissent
continues that a vagueness attack cannot honestly be answered by declaring the language definite while confessing a complete inability to
express its meaning. As the dissent points out, the search for a valid
definition has been contested by theologians, philosophers, and judges for
centuries; yet the majority expects unsophisticated juveniles to conceptualize and comprehend the full impact of the word. The dissent
closes with a recognition that upholding such vague statutes easily becomes a method of enforcing conformity.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The scope of the "immoral" activities involved in the Texas Juvenile
Act remains unknown. At least one court has held that the term "morals"
encompasses common decency, cleanliness of mind and body, honesty,
2
truthfulness, and proper respect for established ideals and institutions.
Under such a standard, a juvenile could be placed under the custody of
the state for almost any act for a period ranging from six months to
eleven years, depending upon his age, the circumstances of the case, and
the disposition of the judge or jury. Except for those rights acquired
through the Gault decision, juveniles are left to the mercy of the juvenile
judge. His discretion is almost unlimited."2 The legislature apparently preferred to leave the decision to the discretion of the judge to determine
when the juvenile had gone wrong-but at that point it is too late for
the juvenile to do anything about his dilemma. 4 Even if stricter standards
for vagueness are adopted, juveniles, unlike adults, cannot be presumed
to have read, learned, and understood the law.
Kansas and Illinois have attempted a unique solution. By differentiating
between miscreant children and juveniles who have committed more
serious crimes, lesser offenders are provided the opportunity to wipe the
slate clean and start on a new life once they have been corrected for their
improper activity. This was the original intention of those who pushed
for humanitarian reform in 1899" and appears to be the preferable approach to carry out that intent.
(Cadena, J., dissenting).
v. Klein, 93 So. 2d 876, 881 (Fla. 1957).

0447 S.W.2d at 231
0"State

" See Term Paper, supra note 28, at 360.
4
6 1Id.
5 J*. MACK, supra note 23, at 311.
0
6 In Texas, from Sept. 1, 1966, to Aug. 31, 1967, 3,033 children were declared juvenile delinquents. 25.6% of that number were committed for activities which would not carry criminal
punishments for adults. The juvenile records of these delinquents are frequently investigated by
the F.B.I., the military, and certain employers. The fact that one has a juvenile record is also frequently considered by a court when an adult offender requests that his sentence be probated.
Thus, juvenile offenders may face additional problems after they attain majority with respect to
employment and imprisonment, and one of the primary goals of the juvenile statutes has been
frustrated. See Term Paper, supra note 28, at 356.

